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ABSTRACT
Agro-biotechnology is evolving from a pre-commerical phase dominated by basic research
science to a commercial phase oriented around marketing products. In pursuing innovation
rents in the commercial phase, firms are reorienting their strategies around complementary
marketing and distribution assets. This is impacting vertical and horizontal industry struc-
ture. Conversely, industry structure is also impacting firm strategies. Horizontal alliances
and consolidation continue from the pre-commercial phase into the commercial phase,
while vertical coordination and integration strategies are accelerating rapidly. Interplay
between firm strategy and industry structure is too complex for firms to anticipate early
in the pre-commercial phase for long-term strategy formulation.
Key Words: acquisitions, agricultural biotechnology, firm strategy, industry consolidation,
Since
industry structure, mergers.
the development of gene transfer and
cell fusion techniques in the mid- 1970s, agro-
biotechnology has promised fundamental
change in food production, processing, and
distribution systems (Molnar and Kinnucan;
Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development). Agro-biotechnologies with
commercial potential range from transgenic
plants, animals, and fish with improved pro-
duction and quality characteristics to enhanced
systems for pest control, animal health care,
and waste management (Office of Technology
Assessment). Admittedly, the rate of product
introduction has been slower than originally
thought possible. Agro-biotechnology has
been gradually approaching the marketplace in
recent years, however. Although attention has
concentrated on a few products, such as Bo-
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vine Somatotropin, the FlavrSavr@’ tomato,
Roundup Ready@ soybeans, and Bacillus thu-
ringiensis (Bt)-corn and -cotton, over 50 com-
mercial agro-biotechnology products are cur-
rently in the market and twice as many are
expected to enter the market within the next
two to three years.
Much has been written about the potential
reception of agro-biotechnology by farmers
and consumers (Lesser, Magrath, and Kalter,
Lacy, Busch, and Lacy; Zepeda) and its po-
tential impacts on farm structure (Kaiser and
Tauer; Lemieux and Wohlgenant; Marion and
Wills). Other favorite topics of social scientists
have involved intellectual property rights
(Acharya), food safety (Doyle and Marth; Jus-
kevich and Guyer), regulation (Larson and
Knudson), and ethics (Thompson). Yet, little
attention has been directed toward the dynam-
ics of innovation, firm strategy, and industry
structure. Indeed, agro-biotechnological inno-130 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1997
vation, by and large, has been treated exoge-
nously and its relationship with the structure
of agricultural industries has been almost
overlooked. While studies by Just and Hueth,
and Goldburg et al. are exceptions, their hy-
potheses remained untested.
This omission has parallels in the general
innovation literature. As Cohen and Levin
pointed out, “Theorists and empiricists alike
have devoted too little attention to the dynam-
ics of innovation and market structure, the
Schumpeterian process of creative destruc-
tion” (p. 1098). Yet, important contributions
exist, allowing significant understanding of the
dynamics of innovation and industry structure.
Responding to developments in agro-bio-
technology, several agricultural and food in-
dustries have shown a marked change in their
structure. Firm incentives and strategies have
interacted with the nature of the technology to
drive firm mergers, acquisitions, strategic al-
liances, and joint ventures. Such actions, in
turn, may have affected the rate and direction
of agro-biotechnology innovation. This paper
is devoted to the relationship of agro-industrial
structures and biotechnological innovation and
its important implications for both competitive
firm strategy and policy analysis.
Technological Discontinuities and Firm
Strategies
Abernathy and Utterback described the basic
characteristics of innovation cycles which are
initiated through technological discontinuities
or new technological paradigms. A new tech-
nology paradigm is defined as a set of new
models for solving selected technological
problems using specific principles from natu-
ral sciences and material technologies (Dosi).
During the first stage of the innovation cycle,
firms engage in product innovation bringing
forward new technical know-how and product
concepts. Over time, specific new product
concepts become the standard through broad
market acceptance. Then product innovation
subsides in favor of process innovation which
attempts to improve on production and distri-
bution processes (Abernathy and Utterback;
Utterback).
Given that agro-biotechnology is still at its
early developmental stages, our interest con-
centrates on the dynamics of product innova-
tion. We propose that for technological inno-
vations that involve long gestation periods of
research and development (R&D) before mar-
ketable products are developed, Abernathy
and Utterback’s product innovation stage be
separated into two sequential phases: (a) a pre-
commercial technology development phase,
and (b) a commercial phase. The pre-com-
mercial phase involves basic and applied re-
search which may or may not have a direct
commercial target. The commercial phase rep-
resents applications of science and technology
to product development with commercial tar-
gets. As explained later, the significance of
this distinction is that firms face different ex-
ternal conditions and incentives with resultant
strategy effects.
Firm Strategies in the Pre-Commercial
Phase
Following a technological discontinuity, tech-
nological barriers to entry are lowered and
newcomers gain easier entry into affected in-
dustries. They bring forward new scientific
and product concepts and aspire to capture
rents from their innovation, often by integrat-
ing forward. Established firms may also join
in and participate in the innovation process.
Incumbent firms choose from a variety of
technology development strategies. They may
develop technological know-how through in-
house R&D. They may develop new technol-
ogy jointly with other firms through research
contracts, strategic alliances, and joint ven-
tures where they can leverage their technolog-
ical, financial, and market assets. They may
acquire technology through mergers and ac-
quisitions, through licensing of intellectual
property, or through supply agreements (Pi-
sano 1991). Finally, they may adopt a wait-
and-see (imitation) strategy which seeks to
time entry into the innovation race after dom-
inant product concepts have become discern-
ible and market risks reduced (Bozeman and
Link). Minority investments in new entrants
may be used to monitor new technological de-Kalaitzandonakes and Bjornson: Coordination in the Agro-biotechnology Industry 131
velopments and provide a platform for sharing
innovation rents captured by newcomers (Pi-
sano 1988).
In general, collaborative R&D plays an im-
portant role in many high technology indus-
tries (Mowery 1983, 1988). In the presence of
complex and fast changing science, firms find
it increasingly difficult to internalize all R&D
necessary to take new technical know-how all
the way to the market. Here, collaborative
R&D becomes important. Widening geograph-
ic and organizational diversity of new sources
of technology provide further incentives
(Mowery 1988).
Firm Strategies in the Commercial Phase
As the science base begins to stabilize and
commercialization opportunities become in-
creasingly apparent, product formulation,
scale-up, and other forms of product devel-
opment innovation intensify. Complementary
assets (e.g., manufacturing capability, scale-up
experience, marketing, and distribution net-
works) become increasingly important. New-
comers and incumbents alike decide their
commercialization strategies based on the ap-
propriability of innovation rents and their ac-
cess to complementary assets (Teece 1987).
A firm’s ability to appropriate the profits
from its innovation is decided principally by
two factors. The first is the degree of inno-
vation tacitness and the resultant ease of imi-
tation (Teece 1987). A variety of determinants
may contribute to the tacit nature of technical
know-how. Accumulated knowledge and man-
agement experience in research, regulatory
compliance, scaling up, partnership formation,
procurement, and production are significant to
performance. These are difficult to imitate and
difficult to learn. If the technology is not tacit
and can be easily codified and copied, imita-
tors could appropriate a significant share of the
profits from innovation.
The second appropriability factor is the
strength of intellectual property rights avail-
able to the technology (Teece 1987). Firms use
a variety of intellectual property rights, in-
cluding patents and trade secrets, to protect
their technology from imitators. Intellectual
property rights that are not strongly defensible
lead to weak appropriability.
If innovations are strongly appropriable,
and if the complementary assets required for
commercialization are not specialized, then the
innovator ordinarily can contract or make
open-market transactions for these assets’ ser-
vices while capturing its innovation rents. If
innovation is only weakly appropriable and if
the complementary assets are specialized to a
narrow range of potential uses, however, then
the owners of complementary assets may cap-
ture a large portion of the innovation rents. In
this case, innovators must contract or vertical-
ly integrate to gain control of such assets or
lose innovation rents to an outside supplier.
There are numerous market procurement and
coordinating strategies between these two ex-
tremes which may conform to varying degrees
of innovation appropriability and control of
complementary assets.
Pre-commercial and commercial phase
strategies require coordination. Firm strategies
during the pre-commercial phase collectively
define the appropriability of technological in-
novation and condition strategic choices in the
commercialization phase. For example, re-
search contracts and collaborative R&D may
facilitate entry of new competitors and expe-
dite the diffusion of know-how. This dimin-
ishes the tacitness and, hence, appropriability
of the new technology. Similarly, in research
agreements with downstream firms, it may
seem inconsequential during the pre-commer-
cial phase that they own complementary as-
sets. But later in the commercial phase this can
have fundamental impacts on the innovators’
ability to profit. This endogenous appropria-
bility contrasts with Abernathy and Utterback’s
as well as Teece’s framework of exogenous
appropriability determined by institutional ar-
rangements and technological parameters.
Firm Strategy Within a Transaction
Costs and Evolutionary Framework
Given a variety of possible configurations in
the ownership of technical know-how and
complementary market assets, what are the ba-
sic principles guiding the firm strategy deci-132 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1997
sions in both the pre-commercial and com-
mercial phases of the product innovation
cycle? In other words, how do firms choose
their organizational boundaries from a range
of options between a fully vertically integrated
firm with exclusive internal R&D to a concept
firm where all R&D, production, and distri-
bution services are procured through contracts
and markets ?
If markets were efficient in pricing inno-
vation and transacting was costless, special-
ized R&D firms could emerge to sell know-
how and R&D services to downstream firms
(Stigler). In the case of real markets, however,
intellectual property rights enjoy limited pro-
tection, technology transfer costs can be high,
specialized assets can be held up by opportu-
nistic contractors, and licensing and interme-
diate technology markets tend to have limited
importance for capturing innovation rents
(Joly and deLooze; Teece 1981, 1987; Von
Hippel).
Transaction cost theory and evolutionary
economics provide guidance for the choice of
firm innovation strategies (Pisano 1991).
Transaction cost theory suggests that, assum-
ing constant production costs, firms draw their
boundaries so that they minimize the transac-
tion costs of governing economic activity
(Williamson). Two broad categories of trans-
action costs exist: (a) coordination costs for
transferring information and coordinating
complex activities across firm boundaries, and
(b) motivation costs arising from information-
al asymmetries between transacting parties or
from imperfect commitment to a binding
agreement (Milgrom and Roberts). Imperfect
commitment and informational asymmetries
lead to incomplete contracts and invite post-
contractual opportunistic behavior. This raises
the cost of monitoring and enforcing the
agreement.
Coordination costs increase with the com-
plexity and tacitness of the technical infor-
mation exchanged. Transfer of scientifically
complex and not easily codified technical
know-how between firms typically incurs high
coordination costs. Higher coordination costs
discourage outsourcing and make firms more
likely to internalize R&D activities.
Motivation costs increase with the specific-
ity of the required investment. Thus, contract-
ing for the service of specialized assets creates
motivation problems. As the specificity in-
creases, contracting efficiency decreases be-
cause asset specificity transforms the market
into an ex post bilateral trading relation that is
exposed to opportunistic behavior. The irre-
versible investment in specialized assets cre-
ates quasi-rents for the owner that can be op-
portunistically extracted by the other party.
Asset specificity would not pose problems if
comprehensive contracting were feasible,
since this would anticipate all contingencies.
However, bounded rationality precludes this
(Klein, Crawford, and Alchian). R&D con-
tractual agreements are inherently vague since
technical outcomes and intellectual property
rights are difficult to predict and specify ex
ante. When motivation costs are high, firms
are more likely to internalize R&D.
While transaction cost theory provides in-
sights on a firm’s motivation to develop new
technical know-how internally or through ex-
ternal procurement, evolutionary theory fo-
cuses on a firm’s ability to develop such
know-how (internally or externally) under
conditions of rapid change. Evolutional y the-
ory stresses the limits of a firm to change,
adapt, and learn in the short run as it is con-
strained by its own ability to absorb new
knowledge and skills (Nelson and Winter),
Existing routines that coordinate internal firm
activities as well as the specific skill set and
capabilities of the firm may define the likeli-
hood of a firm’s survival under a new (emerg-
ing) technological paradigm.
Transaction cost and evolutionary views
are complementary. Applied to product inno-
vation strategies, evolutionary theory suggests
that only part of the menu of all possible pre-
commercial and commercial strategies is in
fact available to firms. Given the firms’ sep-
arate histories, organizational routines, skills,
and capabilities, different subsets of these
strategies are effectively available to them.
Firms then choose specific strategies from a
relevant sub-menu of strategic options that
minimize production, coordination, and moti-
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specialized investments and for which expect-
ed technical outcomes and intellectual prop-
erty rights can be delineated ex ante, down-
stream firms will more likely opt for
outsourcing R&D with research specialists, es-
pecially when they lack in-house expertise. If
such procurements are foreign to the firm’s
culture and organizational routines, then it
may choose to internalize R&D even with a
lack of expertise and the implied higher costs.
Similarly, firms with organizational routines
geared toward outsourcing and licensing of
technical know-how may opt for collaborative
R&D even when technological outcomes are
uncertain, intellectual property rights are
vague, or exposure to hold-ups is apparent.
Based on the development in the two pre-
vious sections, we now specify the firm’s
product innovation decision process. We pro-
pose that during the pre-commercial phase,
firms maximize technological outcomes and
the degree of appropriability from a given
stream of R&D investments, restricted to a
subset of options defined by their organiza-
tional routines. During the commercial phase,
firms maximize intertemporal net profits from
any additional investment in R&D or comple-
mentary assets. Their strategy is conditioned
on their technology and their appropriability
position secured during the pre-commercial
phase. Organizational routines remain deter-
minant. The significance of separability be-
tween the two phases is that firms’ choices in
the commercial phase are constrained by those
in the pre-commercial phase, and that their
technological bases are sunk costs as firms ap-
proach the market.
Innovation Strategies and Industry
Structure
The number, relative size, and concentration
of suppliers of technical know-how and com-
plementary assets, as well as their degree of
vertical integration into downstream or up-
stream industries, affect the transaction costs
of strategic interactions among firms and their
bargaining power. Hence, industry structure
has a fundamental impact on firm strategy for-
mation in both the pre-commercial and com-
mercial phases.
In the early part of the pre-commercial
phase, technical barriers to entry are low and
many specialized technology firms with simi-
lar technical expertise may enter the innova-
tion cycle, Given their low technical differ-
entiation, their bargaining power may be weak
in selling R&D services to contracting buyers.
Ex ante, their bargaining power is reduced
through competitive bidding. Ex post, power
is limited through exposure to potential hold-
up tactics whereby buyers could terminate the
relationship in favor of a new supplier.
The bargaining power of technology firms
could be enhanced as time goes by and as spe-
cialized desirable technical expertise is devel-
oped. The technology firm’s bargaining posi-
tion may be further strengthened if buyers
must make specialized investments in order to
incorporate the purchased technology into
their own operations and product develop-
ment. As their bargaining power increases,
technology firms can increase the prices of
their R&D services or appropriate a greater
portion of the technology they develop. If buy-
ers are exposed to hold-ups, however, and if
there are few other suppliers to resort to, then
market or contract purchases of technology
may fail. Buyers may be forced to turn to in-
ternal R&D, acquisition of a technology firm,
or a joint venture or strategic alliance where
both transacting parties make irreversible in-
vestments.
Firm size and imperfections in capital mar-
kets may also drive technology strategies to-
ward vertical integration. Long investment
periods required for research and the devel-
opment of commercial products often deplete
the capital resources of specialized startup
technology firms. If capital markets were per-
fect, then they could assess firm prospects and
efficiently allocate capital to firms with a high
present value of expected future profits. But
the technology is often relatively difficult to
assess, and much of the firm’s value lies in the
tacit knowledge held collectively by employ-
ees. This drives many of these firms to devel-
op relations with larger firms that are better
able to evaluate their prospects than are capital134 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1997
markets. Large firms receive technology in ex-
change for capital investments if not outright
acquisition. Thus, a concentrated technology
industry structure and failure in technology
and capital markets can motivate firm strate-
gies that lead to a more vertically integrated
sector.
As product innovation approaches its com-
mercial phase, access to marketing and distri-
bution assets becomes increasingly important.
Strategy emphasis shifts toward the structure
of downstream industries. If downstream in-
dustries are characterized by a large number
of firms operating in competitive markets, then
simple market transactions should be adequate
for technology firms to appropriate innovation
rents. If the new technology is weakly appro-
priable, or specialized to or dependent on
complementary marketing and distribution as-
sets, then the bargaining power of technology
firms is reduced and a large portion of inno-
vation rents may be appropriated by down-
stream firms. The bargaining power of down-
stream industries increases further as they
become increasingly concentrated. Under such
conditions, the technology firms may pursue
forward integration, as long as capital re-
sources allow it and barriers to entry are not
too high.
Based on the above discussion, industry
structure and transaction costs influence strat-
egy. Conversely, firm strategies also influence
industry structure by means of firm coordi-
nation and integration. Hence, there is an in-
timate interplay between industrial structure
and firm strategies fueled by the pursuit of in-
novation rents. This interplay defines the pro-
cess of creative destruction and shapes inno-
vation cycles.
It is now apparent why it is necessary to
separate product innovation into pre-commer-
cial and commercial phases. In the beginning
of a new technological paradigm with long
R&D investment horizons, it is impossible for
firms to predict (a) relevant technological out-
comes, (b) competitors’ future intellectual
property rights positions, or (c) the future
structure of downstream industries. Hence, in
the beginning of a product cycle it is unlikely
that firms can formulate a strategy that effec-
tively maximizes innovation rents because key
parameters are unknown. Firms begin to shape
strategies for the commercial phase only after
technological expertise and intellectual prop-
erty rights positions of competitors are clari-
fied, downstream industry structures appear
stable, and R&D outcomes become predict-
able. These strategies must be tailored to the
firm’s idiosyncratic technology and comple-
mentary asset position in order to maximize
innovation profits from additional R&D in-




We have described a dynamic interplay among
innovation, firm strategy, and industry struc-
ture relevant to complex new science and tech-
nology with long R&D gestation lags. How
much of this description, however, is relevant
to agro-biotechnology? Should we expect that
agro-biotechnology innovation cycles follow
predictable patterns? If so, what are the im-
plications for competitive strategies and in-
dustry structure? To shed some light on these
questions, we analyzed some 1,600 collabo-
rative agreements, joint ventures, mergers,
partial and total acquisitions, licensing agree-
ments, and equity investments related to tech-
nology development and commercialization in
the area of agro-biotechnology over the period
1980 to 1996. This information was collected
from a variety of trade magazines, on-line da-
tabases, company annual reports and news re-
leases, and books and journals related to agro-
biotechnology.
The development of genetic engineering
techniques in the mid- 1970s provided the tech-
nological discontinuity that initiated the agro-
biotechnology innovation cycle. The new sci-
ence permitted new product concepts and
processes for a variety of traditional agri-food
industries (e.g., pesticide, seed, animal health,
and food processing). Numerous new research-
oriented firms entered these industries in pur-
suit of these concepts and the associated inno-
vation rents (figure 1). Under these conditions,













abi-modal structure of technology startups and
traditional established firms. This environment
created opportunities for R&D collaboration
between established firms that needed new
technology, and startups that needed capital re-
sources to finance costly R&D.
Collaborating to Compete
Table 1 shows that in the 1980s, R&D agree-
ments grew at significant rates. Approximately
90% of all R&D agreements included in our
sample were between large established firms
and technology startups. Collaborative agree-
ments involving complementary market assets
(e.g., manufacturing, distribution, and market-
ing services) also grew as time progressed.
Most of the growth in these agreements oc-
curred in the 1990s, implying the maturation of
the technology and its approach to the market.
Figure 2 illustrates the temporal progression of
strategic alliances in R&D and complementary
assets agreements. This progression maps the
pre-commercial and commercial phases of
agro-biotechnology product innovation. R&D
agreements are important during the pre-com-
mercial phase of product innovation. As prod-
uct concepts approach the market, agreements
that marshal the necessary complementary as-
sets for commercialization become important.
Figure 2 shows the transition from the pre-
commercial to the commercial phase in the
case of agro-biotechnology.
The substantial number of strategic alli-




1981– 1986- 1991– 1981–
Activity 85 90 96 96
Mergers and Acquisitions 19 115 274 408
Equity Investment 24 41 47 112
R&D Agreements 84 244 147 475
Joint Ventures 24 77 81 182
LicensingAgreements 6 78 122 206
DistributionAgreements 9 66 109 184
ProductionAgreements 1 3 21 25
Total 167 624 801 1,592
antes in both R&D and market activities sug-
gests that expected synergies exceeded
expected transaction costs enough to encour-
age contractual arrangements without full in-
tegration. Thus alliances were struck among a
variety of firms interested in the new technol-
ogy. The large number of technology startups
with high but weakly differentiated technical
capability indicates that the possibility of
holdups was small or their bargaining power
limited. Such conditions apparently encour-
aged large established firms to outsource ini-
tial efforts to engage with the new technology
rather than investing large sums for building
internal technical capability.
As the complexity of the new science be-
came increasingly apparent and R&D cycles








81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95
Year
Figure 2. Strategic alliances in agro-biotech-
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search became a binding constraint for most
startups. These capital constraints further
weakened the bargaining position of technol-
ogy startups and further encouraged their col-
laboration with well-capitalized established
firms. Following the stock market crash of
1987, venture capital and investor capital re-
sources seeking technology startups were re-
duced. This encouraged collaborative agree-
ments as an alternative means of financing
R&D and commercialization (figure 2).
Hence, financing constraints at the end of the
1980s may have speeded the transition of
agro-biotechnology to its commercial phase.
Internalizing Technological Capability
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have grown
significantly since the mid- 1980s, but the bulk
of these have occurred during the 1990s. Un-
like smategic alliances and licensing agree-
ments which encourage technology transfer,
however, growth in M&As marked the begin-
ning of the internalization of technological ca-
pabilities by firms and the consolidation of the
agro-biotechnology industry. Almost 60% of
the M&As we have counted were carried out
by technology firms attempting to create suf-
ficient financial and technological resources to
integrate forward. Selective partial and total
acquisitions of technology assets by estab-
lished downstream firms were also an impor-
tant part of the observed M&A activity.
Increased integration has occurred primar-
ily during the commercial phase of agro-bio-
technology product innovation. Low innova-
tion appropriability may be a primary
motivating factor because technology firms
may integrate forward to capture their inno-
vation rents. Conversely, firms established in
downstream industries may integrate back-
wards to increase the value of their assets by
internalizing R&D and associated innovation
rents. The profitability of integrating back-
wards improves when their bargaining power
relative to technology firms increases.
While the degree of innovation appropria-
bility is best assessed at the firm level on a
case-by-case basis, we provide an initial gen-
eral appraisal with some informative
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indicators. As the number of firms with exper-
tise or intellectual property rights on a particular
technology increases, the degree of appropria-
bility of the technology will tend to decrease.
Table 2 reports the number of firms experi-
menting with specific agro-biotechnologies with
commercial outlook and the number of firms
owning related patents. It is apparent that no
firm has exclusive claims or expertise on most
agro-biotechnologies with commercial potential.
A number of firms seem to have staked a tech-
nological position. Further, agro-biotechnology
applications tend to be weakly differentiated.
Most differentiation actually comes from rele-
vant complementary downstream assets (e.g.,
brand name of pesticide with which the seed is
tolerant, or brand name of the seed). Under such
conditions, appropriability of the technology in-
novation is weakened.Kalaitzandonakes and Bjornson: Coordination in the Agro-biotechnology Industry 137
Low appropriability for the new technolo-
gies is coupled with moderately concentrated
downstream industries. For example, the top
20 firms in the chemical, seed, and animal
health industries have, respectively, 8890,
47’ZO,and 68?Z0shares of the total global mar-
ket (Heijbroek, deSchutter, and vanGaasbeek;
Watkins). Hence, complementary assets in
these industries may be difficult to acquire and
rather specialized. Low appropriability, high
complementary asset specificity, and down-
stream industry concentration therefore can
provide an adequate explanation of the recent
integration and consolidation of the agro-bio-
technology industry.
As consolidation decreases the number of
technology firms, the motivation of down-
stream firms to internalize R&D through ac-
quisitions or internal growth increases as well.
Hence, the recent patterns of consolidation and
integration in the agro-biotechnology industry
should be expected to continue.
Implications
Treating agro-biotechnology as a uniform tech-
nology, as we have done in this study, is due to
analytical convenience in describing concepts,
rather than due to a need for realism. Agro-bio-
technology is indeed an amalgamation of vari-
ous applications of a similar science. The de-
velopmental stage of various applications is in
many cases quite different. Animal biotechnol-
ogy, for example, is less advanced than plant
biotechnology. Thus, although the proposed
framework and data apply broadly, one may be-
gin to more effectively analyze the dynamics of
innovation, firm strategy, and industry structure
by refining the concept of agro-biotechnology
and focusing on particular applications, Bearing
this in mind, we draw possible implications of
the forces and concepts analyzed.
Consolidation
As the rate of product innovation in agro-bio-
technology diminishes, industry consolidation
will eventually result in a few remaining firms
with significant technical and complementary
asset positions. During this period of consoli-
dation, the market valuation of key comple-
mentary assets is likely to increase. Acquisi-
tion price tags—such as the $1 billion paid by
the Monsanto Company for Holdens Founda-
tion Seed, or the $750 million paid by German
chemical giant AgrEvo for the technology
startup Plant Genetic Systems—may be un-
precedented but not surprising.
Integration
The speed and pattern of integration of up-
stream and downstream industries affected by
agro-biotechnology will likely vary across
subsectors and industries. The degree of con-
centration and ownership of technology or
downstream complementary assets will be im-
portant determinants. For example, the animal
health industry should anticipate less change
since most new technology and complemen-
tary assets are in the hands of existing domi-
nant players. This contrasts with the seed in-
dustry, which has few dominant firms and
hundreds of small regional companies that de-
pend on technology firms for access to agro-
biotechnology. This industry could experience
significant structural change and consolida-
tion. The likelihood and patterns of such con-
solidation will depend on the outcomes of cur-
rent competitive games among key players.
Firm Competitive Position
If our conceptual framework and data are rep-
resentative of the agro-biotechnology industry,
then it is implied that future dominant players
already have a presence in the industry. While
the basic science and technology are becoming
increasingly accessible, the accumulated tech-
nology base and complementary assets owned
by incumbent firms will increasingly act as
barriers to new entrants. It is becoming un-
likely that new key players will emerge as
product innovation winds down and as com-
plementary marketing and distribution assets
are controlled by incumbent networks. New
biotechnology startup firms will continue to
enter the industry. However, their likely role
will be limited to contract R&D for tasks that
established firms can easily outsource, es-138 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1997
pecially when intellectual property rights are
clear (e.g., gene and protein discovery). Eco-
nomic rents to this R&D will be minimal. Yet,
as process innovation in agro-biotechnology
progresses, opportunities for efficient division
of labor among established firms and research
specialists should expand. Key new technolo-
gies, however, will be increasingly developed
internally by established firms that have built
the necessary technological base for funda-
mental research and product development. In-
ternalization will increase the appropriability
of innovation and will mark a more proprie-
tary era for agro-biotechnology. Their posi-
tions could be dominant.
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